Still Trying to Squeeze Iran

By: ADAM ZAGORIN

An exterior view building of the Bushehr nuclear power plant near the Persian Gulf, 1,000 kms south of Tehran, Iran Mohammad Kheirkhah / UPI / Landov A new U.N. Security Council resolution punishing Iran for its failure to comply with demands to cease uranium enrichment remains weeks away, despite last week's agreement on the matter between the five permanent Council members plus Germany. And the most positive spin U.S. officials are able to put on the new sanctions package is that it will carry the support of Russia and China. That support, of course, comes at a price: The new resolution is unlikely to be more than a mildly incremental increase of the existing sanctions package, which Tehran has simply ignored.  Western members of the Council are pressing for a resolution that requires countries to deny entry to any person involved in Iran's nuclear programs and, for the first time, include a ban on all trade in civilian nuclear equipment or technology that could also be used to create nuclear weapons. The U.S. and its allies also want U.N. member states to be asked to inspect cargo heading to and from Iran if there is reason to believe that contraband is aboard — a measure that raises the danger of further incidents at sea between U.S. and Iranian warships in the already tense Persian Gulf. Progress in escalating sanctions has been undermined by Iran's posture, which while defying the demand to cease uranium enrichment has, nonetheless, demonstrated a greater willingness to cooperate with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to resolve the underlying transparency issues that prompted the U.N.'s demand for an enrichment freeze in the first place. A new IAEA report is expected by the Council in February, which could cite further evidence of Iranian cooperation. But a far more important political impediment to raising the pressure on Iran came late last year with the revised U.S. National Intelligence Estimate, which concluded that Iran had stopped its nuclear weapons program in 2003. The news that U.S. intelligence believes Iran currently has no active nuclear weapons program undermined the case for urgency claimed by the Bush Administration and by Israel in their argument to esclate sanctions. President Bush and others have sought to overcome this setback, maintaining that the civilian nuclear technologies Iran is pursuing would give it the means to build nuclear weapons, and by pointing out the NIE's contention that Iran halted its weapons program "...primarily in response to international pressure... [indicating] Tehran's decisions are guided by a cost-benefit approach rather than a rush to a weapon irrespective of the political, economic, and military costs." That statement has been seized on by proponents of sanctions to make the case not only for new U.N. sanctions, but also for unilateral U.S. action, particularly in the international financial system. Several months ago, the U.S. banned all dealings with three of Iran's largest financial institutions, Bank Melli, Bank Mellat and Bank Saderat, claiming they were facilitating terrorism and supporting weapons proliferation. Washington also cited Iran's Revolutionary Guards Corps for weapons proliferation and accused its elite Quds Force of providing material support for terrorist organizations. Individuals and companies affiliated with both organizations were also cited. These citations are used to warn financial institutions doing business with U.S. banks against dealings with the named Iranian companies and individuals, hampering Tehran's access to the credit and financial instruments of international trade.